:: 관련 글 ::
2020/04/01 - [가상화폐] - [북한 관련 UN 보고서] 북한의 가상통화를 활용한 금융제재 회피1
2020/04/01 - [가상화폐] - [북한 관련 UN 보고서] 북한의 가상통화를 활용한 금융제재 회피 2
2020/04/01 - [가상화폐] - [북한 관련 UN 보고서] 북한 사이버테러 현황 정리(Annex 21)
2020/04/01 - [가상화폐] - [북한 관련 UN 보고서] 북한의 사이버테러 방식 정리(Annex 22)
2020/04/01 - [가상화폐] - [북한 관련 UN 보고서] Marine Chain 증빙(Annex 25)
Annex 27: Additional findings in Marine Chain case investigation
1. After signing the consultancy contract on 18 January 2018, Kim indicated to Foong in a text message that he was to hold 100% of the company’s shares. Foong objected to this on the grounds that it was “too much responsibility” for him and “not much time to look after the operation aspect”. Kim replied that he should not worry about the company’s operations, stating, “you can simply write me authorization letter to handle operation.” (See next Annex)
2. Despite Kim’s role in directing company operations, Foong was unable to answer basic questions about or provide basic information, contacts or biodata for him. When pressed, Foong produced some email and text correspondences with “Tony Walker” as well as his alleged address in the US (which misspelled the city “Denver”). Another of the consultants hired by Marine Chain as “Chief Strategist and Development Officer” also complained about the orders emanating from “Tony Walker” who was supposed to be just advising Foong and who was never seen in person. Kim issued directions over email and text and joined meetings via Skype or chat, claiming to be in various countries where he was meeting “potential investors”, including in Italy, China and the US.
3. Despite the opacity around his identity, Kim appears to have been unimpeded in his ability to conduct business globally, hiring more than a dozen wellreputed consultants and law firms across Europe, the US, and Asia with decades of international business experience (See Annex entitled, “Consultants and Law Firms retained by Marine Chain”). Kim dealt directly with most of the consultants and law firms he hired, presenting Foong with bills to pay for services and phone calls for services the substance of which Foong was not aware.
4. After ceasing to make payments into Foong’s Singapore account, Kim disappeared completely in July, leaving Foong to deal with all of the fall-out including unpaid invoices, unpaid consultants etc. Foong tried multiple times to get in touch with Kim, as did other team members. The company was closed in September 2018.